"Love the Great Motherland and Create a Better Home"

As we saw in last month’s Xinhua pictorial on the Xinjiang cotton harvest, the party-state treats economic development and ethnic unity as part of the same process in Xinjiang. Prominent Politburo Standing Committee members, Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang, told us this week that the “love the motherland, create a better home” education/propaganda campaign is essential for development and unity in Xinjiang (see picture above). Chang Chunxian (party secretary for Xinjiang) then made a lengthy speech at a symposium this week on this “education activity”, explaining that the campaign is to “promote ‘leaps and bounds’ development (跨越式发展) and social order”. The Central Government similarly celebrated two years of the campaign by congratulating its own work and the partnership assistance development programmes (对口支援). These are said to have “given Xinjiang an historical opportunity for ‘leaps and bounds’ development and social order” before ending the announcement with repetition of ethnic unity slogans. Despite the party-state’s utter rejection that development leads to democracy this is their version of modernisation theory; development will somehow automatically promote ethnic unity and social order along China’s ‘new frontier’. There is a delicious irony here, given that a real historical-materialist would scoff at the need for propaganda campaigns at the level of the materially determined superstructure. More seriously, how leaders have been able to ignore that regions such as Guangdong enjoy some of the highest rates of development and popular protest in China is curious. Perhaps, this may be based on personal politics and the ongoing need to exclude Bo Xilai and all ‘new left’ politics.  However, this then raises the question of why socialist poster campaigns are good for Xinjiang but for Chongqing this is said to be going back to the days of the Cultural Revolution!

All of the above statements coincided with the opening of an exhibition to commemorate the campaign attended by political and military leaders. Even if you can’t make it to Xinjiang, the authorities provided a web portal to experience the “two historical missions” of the “shared struggle” for unity and development yourself! The picture of Hu Jintao surrounded by uncomfortable looking Uyghurs in traditional dress providing him with fruit against a backdrop of urban development just about sums up the party-state’s paternalist approach to Xinjiang politics. Artists have been mobilised to support these occasions and show that Uyghurs really do love the motherland. The Karimay local government did a fine job of mobilising some young men to point at ethnic minorities in a manner Kim Jung-Il would have been proud of. Even children were mobilised in Kuytun, Ili last year to paint for the motherland in a competition to see which little flower could prove their commitment to Socialist modernity with the greatest vigour. If Mao Zedong was with us, he may think that his ideals expressed in the ‘Yan’an talks on literature and art’ that art must only be used to serve the cause of socialist revolutionary struggle had been fully realised.

Socialist symbolism in a capitalist economy has become a source of mockery in other parts of China led by artists such as Wang Guangyi. It then seems absurd that socialist symbolism to promote nationalism and capitalism is seen as a solution to development and social tensions in Xinjiang. In practical terms, what does all this mean? Well on one level, nothing. Radio Free Asia ran a story this week that homes in Aksu were being destroyed without consent or adequate compensation. This certainly indicates that “creating a better home” is something that will be done for the people and not by them. However, what the campaign does indicate is that the party-state is well aware that it needs popular support for its policies in Xinjiang. Otherwise these campaigns will remain comical poster series which no one takes seriously. The obvious advice here would be to get the development policies right first and then get people to point at propaganda posters later.

State-Capitalism with Xinjiang Characteristics

(Industrial) development has once again been dominating the headlines on Xinjiang. Xinhua proudly announced that Xinjiang, which already accounts for half of China’s cotton output, has set a new record for cotton production (838.31kg per mu). Last month Xinhua celebrated the cotton harvest with a pictorial (see above photo) showcasing how the development of industry and the happiness of ethnic minorities go hand in hand. Let’s hope this development strategy has a plan B given that the water resources required to keep the industry going in a desert region are finite. It is important to remember that the cotton industry was highly unprofitable in the 1990s but was used to justify land reclamations and to attract Han-Chinese migrants from outside Xinjiang to staff this labour-intensive industry.

News that PetroChina are opening 10 blocks to foreign firms for oil and gas exploration is relatively unusual in a region where the economy remains dominated by domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, the fact that the procedure is by “invitation only” indicates the ongoing importance of the party-state in Xinjiang’s opaque political economy. Nur Bekri has publicly expressed his eagerness to involve Indian business in Xinjiang to recreate the “Silk Road”. Nevertheless, Indian businessmen declined the chance to participate in a trade conference in Urumchi. It seems a Mr Wang who has been making funny phone-calls to all the airline companies pretending to be an East Turkestan “terrorist” may be putting them off. Bekri seems equally keen to retain the role of the state in the economy with calls for State-owned enterprises to invest in India’s infrastructure. Has this particular area of investment reached saturation point for now within Xinjiang leading SOEs to expand outwards in search of capital? The role of the state in the Xinjiang economy (accounting for about 2/3 of GDP) is an opportunity to build a foundation for sustainable development. However, it appears to be directed primarily towards maintaining the profitability of large-scale SOEs. Is it unrealistic to expect the government to re-direct state-owned enterprises towards the promotion of socio-economic development to provide employment in Xinjiang?

Detentions and Disappearances

For anyone paying attention to China, the Chinese party-state’s celebration of its advances in “rule by law” have been somewhat overshadowed by the Chen Guangcheng affair and the “disappearance” of AiWeiwei’s lawyer. Those of us paying to attention to Xinjiang will know that arbitrary detentions are not unusual in this part of the world and actually seem to be on the rise since the violence of July 2009. Some Uyghur rights groups claim up to 10,000 remain missing but we may never find out. The last few weeks have seen some strange reports in this regard. Radio Free Asia ran the story of Rozimemet Aziz, who disappeared with no explanation from the authorities after being detained on July 31^st 2009. What was odd about this case was that he was a party member who is claimed to have volunteered to provide paramilitary police with water and fruit whilst on duty in Urumchi. Not your average terrorist then!

Radio Free Asia also reported that the police witness who was dealing with such cases mysteriously died last week and his death looks likely to remain a mystery. Those petitioning the central authorities to find their loved ones have been bizarrely banned from Beijing buses and allegedly beaten by police. Perhaps if Melissa Chan, the journalist looking into China’s “black jails” hadn’t been expelled, she could have taken a look at Xinjiang. Hopefully someone else will as the world’s media are too quiet too often on all things Xinjiang.

Security of What?

Authorities in Khotan have been continuing their closures of unlicensed religious schools. However, with 12children hurt in a raid this is unlikely to reduce the demand for such schools. UHRP report that police are undergoing extensive searches of all neighbourhoods with the right to use force where they deem fit. As is often in the case in Xinjiang, security measures will probably likely lead to greater insecurity as locals feel targeted and discontent grows. On this front, the biggest story doing the rounds of the blogosphere at the moment is the case of the Hotan Prefecture Jinxing Trading Company, which banned the sale of clothing with “religious characteristics” from its property. This is allegedly under orders from the local government and will mean no leases for Uyghur businesswomen. It will also mean no entry to these markets if you wear clothes deemed to have “religious characteristics”. These restrictions apply to the veil as well as the jilbab, which leaves the face entirely open (pictured above). It is unlikely that Uyghurs will accept this has any “security” benefits as it continues to arbitrarily mark out Uyghurs and in this case Uyghur woman as “dangerous”.