"Love the Great Motherland and Create a Better Home"

As we saw in last month’s Xinhua pictorial on the Xinjiang cotton harvest, the party-state treats economic development and ethnic unity as part of the same process in Xinjiang. Prominent Politburo Standing Committee members, Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang, told us this week that the “love the motherland, create a better home” education/propaganda campaign is essential for development and unity in Xinjiang (see picture above). Chang Chunxian (party secretary for Xinjiang) then made a lengthy speech at a symposium this week on this “education activity”, explaining that the campaign is to “promote ‘leaps and bounds’ development (跨越式发展) and social order”. The Central Government similarly celebrated two years of the campaign by congratulating its own work and the partnership assistance development programmes (对口支援). These are said to have “given Xinjiang an historical opportunity for ‘leaps and bounds’ development and social order” before ending the announcement with repetition of ethnic unity slogans. Despite the party-state’s utter rejection that development leads to democracy this is their version of modernisation theory; development will somehow automatically promote ethnic unity and social order along China’s ‘new frontier’. There is a delicious irony here, given that a real historical-materialist would scoff at the need for propaganda campaigns at the level of the materially determined superstructure. More seriously, how leaders have been able to ignore that regions such as Guangdong enjoy some of the highest rates of development and popular protest in China is curious. Perhaps, this may be based on personal politics and the ongoing need to exclude Bo Xilai and all ‘new left’ politics.  However, this then raises the question of why socialist poster campaigns are good for Xinjiang but for Chongqing this is said to be going back to the days of the Cultural Revolution!

All of the above statements coincided with the opening of an exhibition to commemorate the campaign attended by political and military leaders. Even if you can’t make it to Xinjiang, the authorities provided a web portal to experience the “two historical missions” of the “shared struggle” for unity and development yourself! The picture of Hu Jintao surrounded by uncomfortable looking Uyghurs in traditional dress providing him with fruit against a backdrop of urban development just about sums up the party-state’s paternalist approach to Xinjiang politics. Artists have been mobilised to support these occasions and show that Uyghurs really do love the motherland. The Karimay local government did a fine job of mobilising some young men to point at ethnic minorities in a manner Kim Jung-Il would have been proud of. Even children were mobilised in Kuytun, Ili last year to paint for the motherland in a competition to see which little flower could prove their commitment to Socialist modernity with the greatest vigour. If Mao Zedong was with us, he may think that his ideals expressed in the ‘Yan’an talks on literature and art’ that art must only be used to serve the cause of socialist revolutionary struggle had been fully realised.

Socialist symbolism in a capitalist economy has become a source of mockery in other parts of China led by artists such as Wang Guangyi. It then seems absurd that socialist symbolism to promote nationalism and capitalism is seen as a solution to development and social tensions in Xinjiang. In practical terms, what does all this mean? Well on one level, nothing. Radio Free Asia ran a story this week that homes in Aksu were being destroyed without consent or adequate compensation. This certainly indicates that “creating a better home” is something that will be done for the people and not by them. However, what the campaign does indicate is that the party-state is well aware that it needs popular support for its policies in Xinjiang. Otherwise these campaigns will remain comical poster series which no one takes seriously. The obvious advice here would be to get the development policies right first and then get people to point at propaganda posters later.

State-Capitalism with Xinjiang Characteristics

(Industrial) development has once again been dominating the headlines on Xinjiang. Xinhua proudly announced that Xinjiang, which already accounts for half of China’s cotton output, has set a new record for cotton production (838.31kg per mu). Last month Xinhua celebrated the cotton harvest with a pictorial (see above photo) showcasing how the development of industry and the happiness of ethnic minorities go hand in hand. Let’s hope this development strategy has a plan B given that the water resources required to keep the industry going in a desert region are finite. It is important to remember that the cotton industry was highly unprofitable in the 1990s but was used to justify land reclamations and to attract Han-Chinese migrants from outside Xinjiang to staff this labour-intensive industry.

News that PetroChina are opening 10 blocks to foreign firms for oil and gas exploration is relatively unusual in a region where the economy remains dominated by domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, the fact that the procedure is by “invitation only” indicates the ongoing importance of the party-state in Xinjiang’s opaque political economy. Nur Bekri has publicly expressed his eagerness to involve Indian business in Xinjiang to recreate the “Silk Road”. Nevertheless, Indian businessmen declined the chance to participate in a trade conference in Urumchi. It seems a Mr Wang who has been making funny phone-calls to all the airline companies pretending to be an East Turkestan “terrorist” may be putting them off. Bekri seems equally keen to retain the role of the state in the economy with calls for State-owned enterprises to invest in India’s infrastructure. Has this particular area of investment reached saturation point for now within Xinjiang leading SOEs to expand outwards in search of capital? The role of the state in the Xinjiang economy (accounting for about 2/3 of GDP) is an opportunity to build a foundation for sustainable development. However, it appears to be directed primarily towards maintaining the profitability of large-scale SOEs. Is it unrealistic to expect the government to re-direct state-owned enterprises towards the promotion of socio-economic development to provide employment in Xinjiang?

Internal Colonialism?

One wonders where Xinjiang fits into China’s “double-digit growth” and “opening to the world”. The party line is one of “subsidies” and “handouts” for a “backward” region. This language reeks of colonialism. Given Xinjiang’s status as a major resource provider for the rest of China, some scholars have said the party-state’s development model for Xinjiang lends itself to charges of “internal colonialism”: the internal transfer of resources outwards to more developed regions and the transfer of labour inwards, thus keeping the region in a peripheral state of underdevelopment vis a vis more developed “core” regions. One obvious means to promote development in Xinjiang would be to assist local small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and provide incentives to employ locals instead of transferred or temporary labour.

A recent report from the Bank of Communications and Fudan University found that while SMEs had grown in every part of China, they have sadly contracted in the “western regions”. This has been a problem across China with the Wall Street Journal’s graphics illustrating the spectacularly low levels of credit provided to SMEs compared to rising levels for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Everyone in China knows that the wages and benefits which come with employment by SOEs are huge- golden rice bowl? So no surprises then that the China Daily reported even larger wage growth for SOEs. Given that about two thirds of Xinjiang’s GDP is produced by SOEs, one would think this might be good news for Xinjiang. However, Wang Zhile, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Trade and Economic Co-operation, is instead celebrating the comparative advantage of the region as a source of cheap labour. Internal colonialism- maybe? Wang somewhat exaggerates that Xinjiang is a “hot destination” for foreign investment, which the China Daily excitedly claim will be the “new engine for China’s auto-biz”. Shanghai Volkswagen (a joint venture) intends to set up shop in Urumqi to the tune of $316 million. The question anyone interested in development will ask is will any of the benefits be captured? Not if they don’t employ locals. The story also ran with the mindboggling statistic that between 2009 and 2011 the number of cars in Urumqi doubled to 400,000 – that’s about a car for every 7.5 people and about three times the national figure. As if Urumqi air wasn’t filthy enough. Nevertheless, we should pause to wonder who is it that has all this money in Urumqi?

Finally, the idea that Xinjiang is a drain on the empire’s resources gets blown out the water again as officials quietly admitted that more electricity from the north of Xinjiang will be sentEast. Still no mention of subsidising backward China though! Vice Premier Li Keqiang, like the rest of China’s leaders at the moment, is seriously worrying about slowing national growth. The answer for the rest of China is “boost consumption”. For Xinjiang, the old “increase ties with Central Asia” gets wheeled out with no explanation of how. Exports out of Xinjiang dropped by 50% in 2010 yet imports recorded growth. Helping boost SMEs (ie local traders) and loosen border restrictions would be a very straight-forward way to boost development and alleviate charges of “internal colonialism”.