Internal Colonialism?

One wonders where Xinjiang fits into China’s “double-digit growth” and “opening to the world”. The party line is one of “subsidies” and “handouts” for a “backward” region. This language reeks of colonialism. Given Xinjiang’s status as a major resource provider for the rest of China, some scholars have said the party-state’s development model for Xinjiang lends itself to charges of “internal colonialism”: the internal transfer of resources outwards to more developed regions and the transfer of labour inwards, thus keeping the region in a peripheral state of underdevelopment vis a vis more developed “core” regions. One obvious means to promote development in Xinjiang would be to assist local small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and provide incentives to employ locals instead of transferred or temporary labour.

A recent report from the Bank of Communications and Fudan University found that while SMEs had grown in every part of China, they have sadly contracted in the “western regions”. This has been a problem across China with the Wall Street Journal’s graphics illustrating the spectacularly low levels of credit provided to SMEs compared to rising levels for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Everyone in China knows that the wages and benefits which come with employment by SOEs are huge- golden rice bowl? So no surprises then that the China Daily reported even larger wage growth for SOEs. Given that about two thirds of Xinjiang’s GDP is produced by SOEs, one would think this might be good news for Xinjiang. However, Wang Zhile, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Trade and Economic Co-operation, is instead celebrating the comparative advantage of the region as a source of cheap labour. Internal colonialism- maybe? Wang somewhat exaggerates that Xinjiang is a “hot destination” for foreign investment, which the China Daily excitedly claim will be the “new engine for China’s auto-biz”. Shanghai Volkswagen (a joint venture) intends to set up shop in Urumqi to the tune of $316 million. The question anyone interested in development will ask is will any of the benefits be captured? Not if they don’t employ locals. The story also ran with the mindboggling statistic that between 2009 and 2011 the number of cars in Urumqi doubled to 400,000 – that’s about a car for every 7.5 people and about three times the national figure. As if Urumqi air wasn’t filthy enough. Nevertheless, we should pause to wonder who is it that has all this money in Urumqi?

Finally, the idea that Xinjiang is a drain on the empire’s resources gets blown out the water again as officials quietly admitted that more electricity from the north of Xinjiang will be sentEast. Still no mention of subsidising backward China though! Vice Premier Li Keqiang, like the rest of China’s leaders at the moment, is seriously worrying about slowing national growth. The answer for the rest of China is “boost consumption”. For Xinjiang, the old “increase ties with Central Asia” gets wheeled out with no explanation of how. Exports out of Xinjiang dropped by 50% in 2010 yet imports recorded growth. Helping boost SMEs (ie local traders) and loosen border restrictions would be a very straight-forward way to boost development and alleviate charges of “internal colonialism”.  

Detentions and Disappearances

For anyone paying attention to China, the Chinese party-state’s celebration of its advances in “rule by law” have been somewhat overshadowed by the Chen Guangcheng affair and the “disappearance” of AiWeiwei’s lawyer. Those of us paying to attention to Xinjiang will know that arbitrary detentions are not unusual in this part of the world and actually seem to be on the rise since the violence of July 2009. Some Uyghur rights groups claim up to 10,000 remain missing but we may never find out. The last few weeks have seen some strange reports in this regard. Radio Free Asia ran the story of Rozimemet Aziz, who disappeared with no explanation from the authorities after being detained on July 31^st 2009. What was odd about this case was that he was a party member who is claimed to have volunteered to provide paramilitary police with water and fruit whilst on duty in Urumchi. Not your average terrorist then!

Radio Free Asia also reported that the police witness who was dealing with such cases mysteriously died last week and his death looks likely to remain a mystery. Those petitioning the central authorities to find their loved ones have been bizarrely banned from Beijing buses and allegedly beaten by police. Perhaps if Melissa Chan, the journalist looking into China’s “black jails” hadn’t been expelled, she could have taken a look at Xinjiang. Hopefully someone else will as the world’s media are too quiet too often on all things Xinjiang.

Security of What?

Authorities in Khotan have been continuing their closures of unlicensed religious schools. However, with 12children hurt in a raid this is unlikely to reduce the demand for such schools. UHRP report that police are undergoing extensive searches of all neighbourhoods with the right to use force where they deem fit. As is often in the case in Xinjiang, security measures will probably likely lead to greater insecurity as locals feel targeted and discontent grows. On this front, the biggest story doing the rounds of the blogosphere at the moment is the case of the Hotan Prefecture Jinxing Trading Company, which banned the sale of clothing with “religious characteristics” from its property. This is allegedly under orders from the local government and will mean no leases for Uyghur businesswomen. It will also mean no entry to these markets if you wear clothes deemed to have “religious characteristics”. These restrictions apply to the veil as well as the jilbab, which leaves the face entirely open (pictured above). It is unlikely that Uyghurs will accept this has any “security” benefits as it continues to arbitrarily mark out Uyghurs and in this case Uyghur woman as “dangerous”.