4 Human Lives Lost in Korla

With Radio Free Asia reporting 4 killed in Korla and the Xinjiang Far West China blog now reviewing comments and photos from Weibo, it appears a good time to wish media outlets the very best in their efforts to make sense of the often insensible. UyghurBiz have provided photos from the scene and an interview with one witness. The dispute seems to be between a group of Uyghurs and a group of Han men over gambling in a video game arcade. It is perfectly plausible that this escalated due  to existing tensions between Han and Uyghurs in the city. However, it would be enormously helpful if the world's media focused on finding out what happened here and, ideally, by actually visiting the city. We wish journalists well in resisting the temptation to churn out articles rapidly with cut and paste sections from earlier cut and paste jobs which summarise life in the region through crass essentialisations of "restive region", "ethnic riots", and "Muslim discontent". Let's not ethnicise people's lives without asking them how they understand these incidents first.

Chinese Atheist Jihad Hits Michigan

This week saw a typical example of official accounts of “terrorism” in Xinjiang and the importance of power in the reproduction of “knowledge”: un-named Chinese officials from un-named departments spoke anonymously and without any evidence to claim that Uyghur “terrorists” are training and operating in Syria. Just to illustrate the point, we would like to announce that we have discovered that Han Chinese terrorists are training with the Michigan militias under the command of the HAM (Han Atheist Movement). How do we know this? Well we can’t tell you but we can assure you that this is a grave threat to the unity of the nation and social stability. Now these shocking revelations are unlikely to be picked up by news agencies and instead will be taken as the random, baseless, and concocted nonsense that they are. Of course, if you are a Chinese official then you have the power to randomly disseminate your ‘truth’ but if you are a blogger, you are actually burdened by the need to have evidence! One of the groups allegedly responsible for this international terrorist threat, the East Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association (ETESA), responded by saying that these claims are only designed to marginalise Uyghurs in the international community because they are not a terrorist organisation and have been legally established in Turkey. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has yet to respond because even they don’t know who they are! Thankfully these stories didn’t make too much impact on the international news but they do indicate that the party-state’s strategy in speaking to the world about Uyghurs centres on imagining a transnational terrorist threat.

Stability Overcomes Everything?

The People’s Daily has disturbingly reported that officials will be dismissed on the spot if their areas of responsibility became unstable. This creates a system whereby the livelihood of officials and their families depend on their readiness to respond to any public dissent with violence or to engage in covering it all up. As if this wasn’t potentially destabilising enough, announcements were also made that the Bingtuan Armed Police has been elevated to a status equal to the Xinjiang Armed Police! The Bingtuan armed police will now report directly to the Central Military Commission in Beijing and is consolidating its status as a state within a state. This means that in instances of unrest, Xinjiang will have two armed paramilitary organisations which are not accountable to one another and could potentially find themselves in competition over state resources and areas of responsibility. Given that this was coupled with announcements that officials will be fired on the spot in any instances of “instability”, this could lead to rather unstable and unpredictable consequences. Furthermore, officials will have personal vested interests in ensuring that no one ever finds about such problems. So we can expect more secrecy, more rumours, and more instability in a region where the party tells us that “stability overcomes everything”!

"Love the Great Motherland and Create a Better Home"

As we saw in last month’s Xinhua pictorial on the Xinjiang cotton harvest, the party-state treats economic development and ethnic unity as part of the same process in Xinjiang. Prominent Politburo Standing Committee members, Li Changchun and Zhou Yongkang, told us this week that the “love the motherland, create a better home” education/propaganda campaign is essential for development and unity in Xinjiang (see picture above). Chang Chunxian (party secretary for Xinjiang) then made a lengthy speech at a symposium this week on this “education activity”, explaining that the campaign is to “promote ‘leaps and bounds’ development (跨越式发展) and social order”. The Central Government similarly celebrated two years of the campaign by congratulating its own work and the partnership assistance development programmes (对口支援). These are said to have “given Xinjiang an historical opportunity for ‘leaps and bounds’ development and social order” before ending the announcement with repetition of ethnic unity slogans. Despite the party-state’s utter rejection that development leads to democracy this is their version of modernisation theory; development will somehow automatically promote ethnic unity and social order along China’s ‘new frontier’. There is a delicious irony here, given that a real historical-materialist would scoff at the need for propaganda campaigns at the level of the materially determined superstructure. More seriously, how leaders have been able to ignore that regions such as Guangdong enjoy some of the highest rates of development and popular protest in China is curious. Perhaps, this may be based on personal politics and the ongoing need to exclude Bo Xilai and all ‘new left’ politics.  However, this then raises the question of why socialist poster campaigns are good for Xinjiang but for Chongqing this is said to be going back to the days of the Cultural Revolution!

All of the above statements coincided with the opening of an exhibition to commemorate the campaign attended by political and military leaders. Even if you can’t make it to Xinjiang, the authorities provided a web portal to experience the “two historical missions” of the “shared struggle” for unity and development yourself! The picture of Hu Jintao surrounded by uncomfortable looking Uyghurs in traditional dress providing him with fruit against a backdrop of urban development just about sums up the party-state’s paternalist approach to Xinjiang politics. Artists have been mobilised to support these occasions and show that Uyghurs really do love the motherland. The Karimay local government did a fine job of mobilising some young men to point at ethnic minorities in a manner Kim Jung-Il would have been proud of. Even children were mobilised in Kuytun, Ili last year to paint for the motherland in a competition to see which little flower could prove their commitment to Socialist modernity with the greatest vigour. If Mao Zedong was with us, he may think that his ideals expressed in the ‘Yan’an talks on literature and art’ that art must only be used to serve the cause of socialist revolutionary struggle had been fully realised.

Socialist symbolism in a capitalist economy has become a source of mockery in other parts of China led by artists such as Wang Guangyi. It then seems absurd that socialist symbolism to promote nationalism and capitalism is seen as a solution to development and social tensions in Xinjiang. In practical terms, what does all this mean? Well on one level, nothing. Radio Free Asia ran a story this week that homes in Aksu were being destroyed without consent or adequate compensation. This certainly indicates that “creating a better home” is something that will be done for the people and not by them. However, what the campaign does indicate is that the party-state is well aware that it needs popular support for its policies in Xinjiang. Otherwise these campaigns will remain comical poster series which no one takes seriously. The obvious advice here would be to get the development policies right first and then get people to point at propaganda posters later.

State-Capitalism with Xinjiang Characteristics

(Industrial) development has once again been dominating the headlines on Xinjiang. Xinhua proudly announced that Xinjiang, which already accounts for half of China’s cotton output, has set a new record for cotton production (838.31kg per mu). Last month Xinhua celebrated the cotton harvest with a pictorial (see above photo) showcasing how the development of industry and the happiness of ethnic minorities go hand in hand. Let’s hope this development strategy has a plan B given that the water resources required to keep the industry going in a desert region are finite. It is important to remember that the cotton industry was highly unprofitable in the 1990s but was used to justify land reclamations and to attract Han-Chinese migrants from outside Xinjiang to staff this labour-intensive industry.

News that PetroChina are opening 10 blocks to foreign firms for oil and gas exploration is relatively unusual in a region where the economy remains dominated by domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, the fact that the procedure is by “invitation only” indicates the ongoing importance of the party-state in Xinjiang’s opaque political economy. Nur Bekri has publicly expressed his eagerness to involve Indian business in Xinjiang to recreate the “Silk Road”. Nevertheless, Indian businessmen declined the chance to participate in a trade conference in Urumchi. It seems a Mr Wang who has been making funny phone-calls to all the airline companies pretending to be an East Turkestan “terrorist” may be putting them off. Bekri seems equally keen to retain the role of the state in the economy with calls for State-owned enterprises to invest in India’s infrastructure. Has this particular area of investment reached saturation point for now within Xinjiang leading SOEs to expand outwards in search of capital? The role of the state in the Xinjiang economy (accounting for about 2/3 of GDP) is an opportunity to build a foundation for sustainable development. However, it appears to be directed primarily towards maintaining the profitability of large-scale SOEs. Is it unrealistic to expect the government to re-direct state-owned enterprises towards the promotion of socio-economic development to provide employment in Xinjiang?

A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom recently designated China a “country of particular concern” due to “systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom”. Amnesty International  has also been warning for some time that the human rights situation in Xinjiang has grown worse since July 2009. This week saw Andrea Evans at Foreign Policy bring the world’s attention to the arrests of more “religious extremists” in Xinjiang and severe restrictions on fasting for Ramadan. The growth of religious repression in Xinjiang has been fairly evident to those paying attention. Official signs restricting prayersand beards in hospitals is guaranteed to incite “the Uyghur people to resist even further”, in the words of Dilxat Raxit, spokesman for the World Uyghur Congress.

International media should be applauded for providing the world with a reasonably good coverage of the events of the last week. Al Jazeera quoted the Zonglang township government in Kashgar district, stating that it is “forbidden for Communist Party cadres, civil officials (including those who are retired) and students to participate in Ramadan activities” and that leaders should provide “gifts” of food to ensure they do not fast! The Financial Times astutely brought readers’ attention to the fact that fasting for Hui Muslims in other parts of China is permitted. This helps us see the inflation of the idea of “illegal religious activities” in Xinjiang where repression of Islam is justified as a response to “terrorism”. The only thing missing from this coverage has been to tell the world that these restrictions are nothing new. For some time, it has been de facto illegal for any public servant or anyone under 18 in Xinjiang to visit the mosque or participate in any religious activities. What may be new is that local government are explicitly explaining this on their websites, which suggests increasing confidence that religious practice can be directed by the state.

The BBC and the Guardian ran with the story of the conviction of 20 Uyghurs on terrorist charges. Both quote the World Uyghur Congress, while the Guardian at least points to the restrictions on religious clothing and beards emerging across Xinjiang. However, more cynicism is needed as the world’s media seem unwilling to point to the elephant in the room, which is that these are secret trials in a region with no clear evidence of rule of law. Official explanation of convictions remains typically unusual. The Washington Post and AFP point out these crimes were related to the use of “moveable hard drives” and “mobile phones” to “urge crimes of separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism”. Dilxat, quoted again, claims that China is handing out heavy sentences to Uyghurs “who use the internet to access information that is not controlled by the authorities and who are expressing opposing political views”. We would need more information from official channels to refute these claims as “removable hard drives” are not particularly terrifying.

Chinese officials then used the Global Times to say that “Xinjiang denies suppressing Islam”. This begins with an attack on US “double-standard” to assess China’s “efforts in fighting terrorism”, which offers nothing to address the concerns of Uyghurs. The article then commented on the blatant restrictions on observing Ramadan by quoting a random primary schoolteacher. The teacher claims parents all gave consent for their children to avoid fasting. She then went on to say that crime is committed under the banner of “religious freedom” and that it was important to make sure children aren’t misled by terrorists during Ramadan. Perhaps if officials said things about Islam that weren’t related to terrorism, Uyghurs may feel more secure. The World Uyghur Congress released a statement lamenting that the government ignores the “long-standing history and contribution” of Islam to China and that the authorities “opt to repress all aspects of Uyghur religious heritage, culture, and language, propagating ethnic tensions that need not exist”. Repression is making Uyghurs feel less secure and this will only exacerbate tensions and provoke violence if they have no legitimate means to express themselves. We fully recommend the following article by Sean Roberts of the George Washington University, which argues terrorism in Xinjiang is a “self-fulfilling prophecy” waiting to happen with the growth of repression.

Shaping International Opinion: Holy War or a Dispute over a Seat?

This last week saw a return of many of the usual themes of official public discourse on Xinjiang. This is of course in the lead up to the third anniversary of the violence of July 2009, which saw Uyghurs and Han killing each other in Ürümchi. The authorities blamed an international terrorist plot for the violence committed by Uyghurs and chose not to acknowledge the violence committed against Uyghurs. So this week, China Daily ran with the very brief story of Guo Boxiong, vice chair of the Central Military Commission, announcing that the military and paramilitary forces will maintain stability and stressed the need for a “high level of ideological,political, and action unity”. Meanwhile, two Uyghurs were arrested on Renmin Lu in Ürümchi for giving out leaflets, allegedly on the charge of “incitement to split the country”. Outside of state-media, Radio Free Asia was running the story of Rabigul Yasin. Rabigul is seeking compensation after being “wrongfully shot” by paramilitary forces when hiding in a bin to get away from the July troubles. She was handcuffed and shackled during treatment and then had to bribe the police to release her son. This wouldn’t quite fit with the China Daily’s angle!

The biggest story of the last week was the alleged “attempted hijack” of a place by “terrorists” leaving Hotan for Ürümchi, foiled by SWAT police and passengers. For no real reason, the China Daily made extra effort to mention the anniversary of July 5^th 2009 and not the 7^th when Han residents organised in gangs to kill Uyghurs. The Huffington Post interviewed Dilxat Raxit of the World Uyghur Congress, who claimed the “hijack” was actually just a fight over seat assignments – not an uncommon incident in China! Caixin noted the good fortune of having 20 policeon board at the time with one Chinese blogger claiming 40 SWAT personnel were present. One witness commented on Weibo that this was “good screenwriting, good directing,and great acting”!

As is always the case we should take the party-state’s media organs on this subject as a source of discourse rather than facts: they tell stories which fit ‘facts’ to ideology. The Global Times quoted a “Regional Information Officer” stating that this was “a violent terrorist attack” despite admitting that any links to any terrorist organisation were unclear. The paper, which was once seen as relatively independent in China is now generally mocked by intellectuals. It managed to use the word terrorism 7 times in the brief article making it pretty clear that they want you to think of this as terrorism. They used Li Wei, a security “expert” based in Beijing, to perform mind-bending logical somersaults to state:

Premise: “separatists” want to make noise before 18^th national congress of the Chinese Commmunist Party.

Conclusion: this “hijack” was “motivated by exile groups overseas and their connection is close and underground”!

Convinced? Probably not. Perhaps the saddest part of the story is how international media uncritically regurgitate party-state press releases to a global audience on Xinjiang news. Key codewords, such as “terrorism”, “Islam”, “restive region”, and “ethnic”, which signify “danger”, are disseminated across the world, frightening readers with little or no knowledge of Xinjiang. This suggests people ought to think of Xinjiang as a “dangerous place” and Uyghurs as a “problem” but without any real evidence, background, or discussion. The Guardian, a very well respected broadsheet in the UK, referred to Hotan as “a heavily ethnic Uyghur area”. The article mentioned “holy war” and explained the party-line but without acknowledging that we really have no idea what happened here. Whatever “heavily ethnic” is supposed to mean, it sounds frightening! Internationally respected newspapers would do well to take their responsibilities more seriously in discussing the press releases of governments, particularly when they are used to justify politicised crackdowns on people giving out leaflets or hiding in bins.


EDIT: On the 2nd July, the Global Times confirmed two Uyghurs had been killed in the incident but offered little by the way of explanation, rehashing the "terrorist" narrative before we really know what happened.